Research Interests
Comparative Political Economy; Judicial Politics; Text as Data
Working Papers
(Un)muting the Fire Alarm: Impact of the Establishment of Appellate Courts on Land Dispute Resolution in China
Many authoritarian regimes established administrative courts for information col- lection and agent control. Yet, due to the general power imbalances between the administration and judiciary, judicial oversight may encounter resistance from the bureaucracy. Reforms that enhance judicial supervision therefore may induce countermeasures and yield unintended consequences. Using administrative data on the resolution of land-related disputes between citizens and the Ministry of Land and Resources of China between 2009 and 2017, this paper finds that the establishment of appellate courts didn’t increase the percentage of pro-citizen rulings in courts, but it made upper-level bureaucrats more likely to acknowledge lower-level bureaucrats’ misdeeds. Besides, facing an increasing case flow, judges in lower-level courts became more likely to rule cases on procedural grounds. These findings suggest that local administrators can direct information concerning bureaucratic misconduct away from appellate courts to circumvent judicial oversight.
Lost Shields: The Impact of Anti-Corruption Campaign on Corporate Litigation in China
Scholars have found that state-owned enterprises and connected private firms receive favorable rulings from Chinese courts. Yet, there is little well-identified evidence that can tell us to what degree the biases results from judges' heuristic shortcuts based on the government's priorities, or from corruption. This paper examines the impact of China’ anti-corruption campaign on politically connected firms’ litigation outcomes. Using a unique data-set of 11,913 corporate litigation filed by 1,640 listed firms between 2008 and 2020, it finds that removals of local political-legal officials reduced the winning odds of private firms with connection to local governments, while the campaign had little negative impact on connected SOEs’ winning chance. It suggests that the anti-corruption campaign may contribute to the resurgence of the influence of state-owned economy in China.
Building Legitimacy of Authoritarian Courts: How Central and Local Tension Shapes China's Lay Judge Reform
How do authoritarian regimes construct the legitimacy of their courts? This paper argues that governments at different levels can have divergent preferences on legitimization strategies. The national government instills citizen beliefs in the rule of law through long-term indoctrination, whereas local governments deploy elites to gain citizen compliance with court decisions in the short term. Based on unique data on 170,000 lay judges and 13,000 labor protests in the case of China's lay judge reform between 2013 and 2020, I find that local governments, when faced with protests, will increase the selection of lay judges who are political elites and assign them to hear trials of more administrative and labor cases with the potential for collective action, despite the persistent efforts by the central government to reduce the elitist tendency. The findings suggest that the designated functions of the quasi-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes depend on the priorities and power dynamics among multiple decision makers.
Many authoritarian regimes established administrative courts for information col- lection and agent control. Yet, due to the general power imbalances between the administration and judiciary, judicial oversight may encounter resistance from the bureaucracy. Reforms that enhance judicial supervision therefore may induce countermeasures and yield unintended consequences. Using administrative data on the resolution of land-related disputes between citizens and the Ministry of Land and Resources of China between 2009 and 2017, this paper finds that the establishment of appellate courts didn’t increase the percentage of pro-citizen rulings in courts, but it made upper-level bureaucrats more likely to acknowledge lower-level bureaucrats’ misdeeds. Besides, facing an increasing case flow, judges in lower-level courts became more likely to rule cases on procedural grounds. These findings suggest that local administrators can direct information concerning bureaucratic misconduct away from appellate courts to circumvent judicial oversight.
Lost Shields: The Impact of Anti-Corruption Campaign on Corporate Litigation in China
Scholars have found that state-owned enterprises and connected private firms receive favorable rulings from Chinese courts. Yet, there is little well-identified evidence that can tell us to what degree the biases results from judges' heuristic shortcuts based on the government's priorities, or from corruption. This paper examines the impact of China’ anti-corruption campaign on politically connected firms’ litigation outcomes. Using a unique data-set of 11,913 corporate litigation filed by 1,640 listed firms between 2008 and 2020, it finds that removals of local political-legal officials reduced the winning odds of private firms with connection to local governments, while the campaign had little negative impact on connected SOEs’ winning chance. It suggests that the anti-corruption campaign may contribute to the resurgence of the influence of state-owned economy in China.
Building Legitimacy of Authoritarian Courts: How Central and Local Tension Shapes China's Lay Judge Reform
How do authoritarian regimes construct the legitimacy of their courts? This paper argues that governments at different levels can have divergent preferences on legitimization strategies. The national government instills citizen beliefs in the rule of law through long-term indoctrination, whereas local governments deploy elites to gain citizen compliance with court decisions in the short term. Based on unique data on 170,000 lay judges and 13,000 labor protests in the case of China's lay judge reform between 2013 and 2020, I find that local governments, when faced with protests, will increase the selection of lay judges who are political elites and assign them to hear trials of more administrative and labor cases with the potential for collective action, despite the persistent efforts by the central government to reduce the elitist tendency. The findings suggest that the designated functions of the quasi-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes depend on the priorities and power dynamics among multiple decision makers.
Datasets
Corporate Litigation of Chinese Listed Firms (2008-2019)
Anti-Corruption Investigations in the Political-Legal System of China (2012-Present)
China's Lay Judges (2013-2021)
Litigation Related Petitions to High Courts (2014-2021)
Anti-Corruption Investigations in the Political-Legal System of China (2012-Present)
China's Lay Judges (2013-2021)
Litigation Related Petitions to High Courts (2014-2021)